The foreign policy community has been subjected to considerable rigorous scrutiny by various, generally liberal commentators of late. The proximate cause of the exercise was the New York Times op-ed column from born-and-raised community residents Ken Pollack and Michael O’Hanlon, Iraq invasion supporters who recast themselves as occupation critics in order to create an artificial and highly successful drama around their support for The Surge. The Pollack/O’Hanlon article didn’t at all mark the beginning of questions as to why the range of foreign policy opinion accepted by the institutional press as “serious” is so narrow, or why people who are continually, demonstrably and flagrantly wrong on foreign policy questions remain the primary source of opinion for the press, but it certainly kicked the conversation into high gear.
In the same way that the press recognizes the foreign policy community as its bellwether of acceptable and promotable views on the issues encompassed by the brand, the community recognizes certain politicians as being especially accomplished in the arena (which in turn has the press following suit). Indiana Republican Richard Lugar is the reigning king, although lately he’s threatened by Virginia Republican John Warner; on the Democratic side, the go-to guy is often Lugar’s opposite number on the Senate foreign relations committee, current chairman and presidential candidate Joe Biden, who has been praised by some in the community for his plan, developed in conjunction with Council on Foreign Relations president emeritus Leslie Gelb, to split the country into federal regions under a miraculously empowered strong central government. Biden describes it as an Iraqi version of the Dayton Accords, in which the U.S. imposed a “soft partition” plan upon the fractious children — “We even allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies…” of Bosnia.
The plan has a number of philosophic and practical flaws, beginning with the assumptions that the U.S. has both the right and the capacity to impose a particular form of government upon Iraqis.
Biden argues that because Iraq’s constitution already provides for federalization, his plan calls for no more than institutionalizing something that Iraqis have already agreed to in principle. In practice, though, the federal model, which would add semi-autonomous Shiite and Sunni regional federations to the existing Kurdish one, is opposed not only by most Sunnis, who would be left with resource-poor west-central Iraq for their fiefdom (with none of the ccountry’s 10 largest cities), and who nearly succeeded in scuttling the constitution because of the issue, but by Shia power broker and ardent nationalist Moqtada al Sadr and his millions of followers.
He assumes that the leadership of the various parties to the conflict — in his view, necessarily monolithic blocs of Kurds, Shia and Sunnis — are capable of uniting and controlling their constituent parts, and that they will negotiate the leap necessary to view the U.S. not as an occupying power but an honest broker. At the same time, he acknowledges that they aren’t monolithic: “Once federalism is implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their own and vie for power“.
He says that minorities in the large mixed-population cities, which include Baghdad and, most problematically, Kirkuk, would be protected by international peace-keeping forces. But Baghdad, which Biden would designate a federal city, the capital of the federation, has more than five million residents and would require a peacekeeping force of more than 100,000. Kirkuk, which is the object of a fierce contest between its growing Kurdish population and the various non-Kurdish residents, has a population of more than a million, requiring a peacekeeping force of more than 20,000. Mosul’s mixed population of more than 2 million dictates a peacekeeping force of more than 40,000. Basra is more homogenous, but the city is riven by fighting between rival Shia factions, and its population of about two million includes more than 100,000 Sunnis and smaller numbers of Assyrians, Christians and other ethnic or sectarian minorities: add another 40,000 peacekeepers, and assume the militias would be more tolerant of them than of the undermanned British forces in the area.
Peacekeepers in the Biden plan also draw border patrol duty. At this point we’re looking at more than 200,000 peacekeepers, the great majority of which would necessarily be drawn from countries other than the U.S. because our forces have little local credibility, they’re not trained for peacekeeping and they’re exhausted: Joint Chiefs chairman Peter Pace is about to recommend cutting the U.S. presence in half in order to preserve the physical integrity of the Army, or to attempt to reclaim it.
And this is now. One of the most practical arguments against Biden’s plan is that another 15 months will have passed before Bush is gone and a new president could even begin the enormous diplomatic effort required to implement it under the best of circumstances. (On the plus side, Iraq’s population may have dropped significantly by then, lowering the number of peacekeeping forces dictated by the troop:population ratio of 20:1000.) So the plan seeks to impose, at an unbridgeable distance in time and capacity, a reorganization to which a great many Iraqis are irreconcilably opposed and which does not, in the eyes of many Iraqis who support it, preclude the pursuit of ethnic cleansing to its ideal conclusion.
Biden says that his is the only plan that offers any hope for preserving Iraq as a more or less unitary state and preventing an unmitigated disaster (by supplanting it with a mitigated one). But the effect of its promise is to make things worse; so long as anyone here holds out hope for a cure, the necessary amputation of the U.S. military presence can’t take place. In the unlikely event that the various Iraqi parties become convinced that a Biden-like, internationally enforced partition is in the works, their incentive becomes making sure that the conditions of the peace to be kept are to their liking: the Kurds must have Kirkuk, the Sadrists must have Baghdad, the Iranian-backed parties must battle the Sadrists for oil-rich Basra and the tourism gold mines of the shrine cities, the Sunnis must do whatever they can to prevent the consignment of their collective self to a permanent, welfare-dependent federal underclass. All that is already happening, of course, but the effect of the Biden plan would be to set a date certain for disaster to be averted or confirmed, depending upon the various parties’ frames of reference.
The original iteration of the plan calls for the withdrawal or redeployment of “almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by the summer of 2008″ but for “a small residual force — perhaps 20,000 troops — to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq’s neighbors honest and train its security forces.” And that’s the penultimate step, to be preceded by the crafting of a regional accord among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, the imposition of the federal entity, the creation of a “strong central government,” the allocation of oil resources and the creation and deployment of that 200,000-plus strong international peacekeeping force.
Again, none of that will happen between now and inauguration day in 2009. If the next president adopted the plan, he or she would have to maintain whatever U.S. presence is deemed necessary to preserve whatever degree of disorder exists at the time for as long as it takes to create the international and regional understandings necessary to implement the plan, assuming Iraqis agree to it. The upshot is that we will need to keep a large number of U.S. troops there for, assuming all else goes superbly well, however long it takes to reach the agreements plus the year or so necessary to assemble, train and deploy a peacekeeping force larger than most standing armies.
That would postpone a substantial U.S. drawdown until early in 2010, and even Biden thinks more than a year would be required; he published the plan in May of 2006, and envisioned its completion, as noted above, in the summer of 2008 — two years on.
What the plan does best is provide an excuse for not thinking about how to get out before 2010 or 2011, and about how to deal with the generally unattractive consequences specific to doing so (as opposed to the ones specific to not doing so). With a fair number of congressional Democrats already undisposed to push for withdrawal but uncomfortable with the administration’s fecklessness, the plan will probably start to acquire new adherents during the next few months and could well become the default position for recidivist Democrats, possibly including the eventual Democratic presidential nominee, by the end of the presidential primaries, with the result that we’ll continue stuck in a “get out/hang on” feedback loop while neglecting to adjust for reality, which will continue to come as an unpleasant surprise.
In the simplest terms, Biden’s plan means at least another three or four years of however many troops we can cobble together to keep in Iraq. If Iraqis think the plan might actually come into effect, they’ll redouble their ethnic cleansing exercises and their efforts to control the prime real estate. Sunni nationalists, which seems to include most of the insurgency, would regain their incentive to concentrate on driving us out before the deal was done rather than focusing on quelling the jihadi contingent with our support. If they don’t think it’ll happen, they’ll continue to make best use of our presence for as long as it lasts.
In short, the plan’s great advantage over the Bush administration’s plan is that it’s much more precise in describing the things it won’t accomplish. That’s not really good enough.
Disclaimer: For purposes of this discussion, we’re pretending that a U.S. attack on Iran, which would immediately render moot most of what anyone says about the U.S. in Iraq, can’t happen.
Not sure who wrote this but it sounded like a frustrated attempt at quelling the only rational proposal to a solution to Iraq. Most of the above writer’s comments were made with what seemed to be a lack of both realistic understanding and comprehension to the actual message Biden sends here. He has given the most comprehensive plan for Iraq in simplistic terms. He didn’t get into detail about every stage to peace. It’s not going to be a thriving democracy right away but people won’t be wiping each other out and it will bring value and community to the different sects of Iraq, whose main goal will no longer be control of Bagdhad. Your worst case solution to the partitioning of Iraq holds little and ever frantic, weight. The Republicans front-runners haven’t a clue and the only one on the Democratic side that is capable is Biden. The rest have no relationships, experience or credibility.
Joe, I think Weldon’s analysis is correct. The overriding question here is: How is it that the U.S. can presume to decide what kind of nation Iraq will be?
We invaded without a shred of legitimacy, we’re an occupying force now, and as long as we remain an occupying force we haven’t even a whisper of a hope of gaining the confidence of the Iraqi people, let alone the nations surrounding it and the Islamic Middle East in general.
We destroyed that country, and now we presume to say, “We know what’s best for you.”? Iraqis may indeed opt someday for a federalist system. But I find Biden’s proposal to be presumptuous, pompous and arrogant in the extreme – the fact that he offered it at all, as if he’s entitled, shows me exactly what he’s made of – exceeded in stupidity only by the local Axis of Evil (Bush-Cheney-Kristol), an example of utter cluelessness that drives both Republican and Democratic leaderships. Biden et al are so mired in this Americentric vision of the world that there is no hope of their attaining objectivity. With this plan Biden exposes what he really is: a Tweedle-Dee to Bush’s Tweedle-Dum. As far as I’m concerned, Clinton and Obama are just as dim, given what I’ve seen of their “plans” for Iraq. All of these plans are merely versions of what we have now: Occupation, bloodshed, chaos for the indefinite future, a delusion.
And there’s something pushing this that we don’t talk about nearly enough: every politician who talks about the need to “stabilize” the Middle East is actually talking about stabilizing the flow of oil to the American economy as cheaply as possible. Apparently there is no limit to the number of lives and dollars these leaders are willing to sacrifice for this cause.
I repeat what I said before: We’ve got immediately start a strong diplomatic effort to assemble a peacekeeping force and seek political solutions involving the Iraqis and their neighbors, and offering to fund these efforts and pay for the damage we’ve done. We can begin this work at the same time we’re getting the hell out of Iraq as fast as we can.
We have no right to be there, we have no right to determine the nature of the future Iraq. All we should be doing is leaving, and trying to remedy the catastrophe we visited upon that country and its people.
Joe, thanks for visiting the site. I think federalism is a pretty good idea for the two thirds of Iraqis who won’t be completely screwed under the system. The question is whether Biden’s plan is workable. I don’t think it is, and I gave a — like Biden — shorthand version of why. As for Biden’s credibility, for all I know, Neil Kinnock wrote the plan; it certainly isn’t original to Biden. People have been promoting a federal Iraq for decades, including, at one time, Saddam Hussein. You call it rational, I call it imagining a sequence of escalatingly unlikely events. We need a different plan, one not involving magical thinking.
Sir, you talked a lot about other people’s plans but you did not come up with anything to put an end to the mess in Iraq. OK, you say partition doesn’t work? If someone has a better idea to put an end to the endless tragedies in my country, it’s time to suggest it. There’s that Chinese proverb: It’s better to light a candle than curse the darkness. How about lighting a candle Mr. angry man!
Another Joe’s take …
WB is correct … Biden is probably the most well known backer of this plan, but it is supported by various others. When he had his radio show, Al Franken basically supported it, bringing in some respectable expert to back him up.
As to it actually being credible, as suggested the alternatives aren’t grand either, I think Monfort promotes a core truth, one that is also highlighted in this business about the Iraqi President having to go (damn Iraqis again aren’t stepping up … it’s all their fault, you see) … we have no business infering in this fashion.
WB thinks the plan faulty. He makes a good case. But, it is up to the Iraqis to decide what they want to do. A majority might push for this plan and support some sort of int’l body to uphold it (cf. Bosnia).
Then, we will have to decide our role. It, however, is unjust to have the current position where Iraqi leadership realizes they have to bow to the will of foreign occupiers, and in the process further violence since this delegitimizes the gov’t, rightly deemed to be puppets.
To clarify: my primary objection to the plan is that it involves keeping U.S. troops there in quantity for another three or four years. If Iraqis want federalism, they have the constitutional means to embrace it, and if they want peacekeepers, mechanisms to achieve that exist as well. But as the resident Joe and Montfort say, it’s their decision, not ours. Meanwhile, the most facilitating thing we can do is get out.
WB-
You say that implementing a fedreal system in Iraq is not our decision to make. Joe Biden or Les Gelb agree with you. I keep reading these denunciations of the Biden/ Gelb plan as being more of the same American ‘imperialism” as Mike Gravel puts it, but the truth is that you clearly haven’t read the Biden plan if that is what you accuse him of. The plan states:
“On October 11, 2006 Iraq’s parliament approved legislation to implement the constitution’s articles on federalism. Prior to the British colonial period and Saddam’s military dictatorship, what is now Iraq functioned as three largely autonomous regions. The United States should strongly promote such an agreement. The final decisions will be up to Iraqis, but if we do not help them arrange the necessary compromises, nothing will get done. At key junctures in the past, we have used our influence to shape political outcomes in Iraq, notably by convincing the Shiites and Kurds to accept a provision allowing for the constitution to be amended following its adoption, which was necessary to secure Sunni participation in the referendum. Using our influence is not the same as imposing our will. With 160,000 Americans at risk, we have a right and an obligation to make known our views.”
Moreover, how is anyone to take you seriously with a headline that basically accuses Biden of encouraging ethnic cleansing. It is absurd on its face, and offensive to me. If there is one thing you cannot accuse Biden of it is that. He has an entire career full of actions, speeches and legislation that prove the exact opposite. When no one was talking about American intervention in Bosnia he was. And he is the only Presidential candidate I know of that says we should act in Darfur now, not wait while thousands and thousands more die. Bill Clinton had to go to Rwanda after his presidency and apologize for his failure to act. Biden was one of the only American officials to call for US intervention there- if he were President he wouldnt have had to apologize after it was too late.
So you dont like the plan, but have no alternative to the plan. What if the Iraqis choose to implement their constitutional choice of federalism? Do you still not support the plan? Your only arguments seem to be: 1. it wont work and 2. its not America’s job to impose such a plan. Well is it our job to impose a unified central government with a president Maliki backed by 160,000 Americans? Because that is what we are doing right now. Biden/ Gelb suggests a residual force of 20,000 International and American troops. Do you think there is any scenario where we will abandon our embassy and Iraq all together and leave no troops for their protection? The only possibiity of that is the total disintegration of any order in Iraq, and if that occurs than we are on the brink of a regional war that will require far more than the 160,000 Americans that are there now. And finally, remember the Biden- Levin amendment, which calls for the US to immediatey begin the withdraw of American troops, which passed the Senate in February of this year. and was vetoed by the president. The goal is to “get out” as you suggest. The question is how to best do that to ensure our grandchildren are not being sent to fight 10 years from now.
Robert,
If I may insert myself in this, perhaps erroneously, I sense that the meaning of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is being used here in two rather different ways. When I read your ¶ about Biden’s record, for example, of calling for intervention in Bosnia and more recently Darfur, as counterevidences, I think actually that the term for you means something similar to what it means for me: namely, actual, genocidal killing for the purpose of ‘accomplishing’ homogeneous society by virtue of exterminating alternate ethnicities.
I don’t think WB is using the term in exactly the same way. Since the goal of ethnic cleansing by perpetrators is to create ‘pure’ ethnic groups, the term gets applied to that goal without necessarily entailing that one particular, most horrific, means to the end. In the sense I believe he means it here and applies it to Biden, ‘ethnic cleansing’ is also accomplished by political/diplomatic means which advocates segregating into nation-states (or, here, autonomous regions) based on ethnicity alone. As such, the creation — and, for the US, the endorsement — of such segregated states for distinctive homogeneous groups (and, in this case only 3 such groups — Kurd, Sunni, Shi`ite — I hear WB raising the issue, among other things: What about the other ethnicities now living in Iraq like Christians or Zoroastrians or … ?) seems troublesome. It’s as if, among other things, the plan means essentially no freedom of religion, which becomes one more of the many ways that the definition of ‘democracy’ we’re supposedly advocating there is all myth and little or no reality….well, given how we tend to define democracy (i.e., usually with an implicit or explicit “bill of rights” for all).
I personally don’t use the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ to refer to this more politically-achieved (rather than genocidally-achieved) isolation of ethnic groups, but it is used and understood that way by others and I believe it’s in that sense that WB is applying the term here.
As to the broader argument of this post/thread, it seems to me that everybody or almost everybody is agreeing that IF such ethnic segregation proves to be what Iraqis as a whole prefer, then so be it. And, indeed, the current amalgam of ethnicities into ‘Iraq’ is the handiwork already of post-colonial imperial design (Churchill et al), but 80-plus years later, there are also — or were also — lots of interweavings, including intermarryings, between the 3 groups such that ‘Iraq’ had taken on a national character for many Iraqis across the 3 major groups, enough so that they did agree (?) on a ‘united’ constitution –such that the question here I believe is: Is it ‘seemly’ (? appropriate/wise/’democratic’) for an American politician to be ‘outfront’ pushing for a particular ‘solution’ (granted, not a “Final Solution”-type solution — which is what I think you are reacting in defense of Biden for — but a “Solution” nevertheless)?
caveat: I recognize I could be misinterpreting or misspeaking for you as well as WB, but this is how the ‘debate’ here strikes me, fwiw.
Before I go, let me add an extra observation of my own here and again perhaps it should be more cautious or circumscribed than I will make it: It’s one thing, in human history, when a nation-state evolves into, or starts out as and remains, a one-ethnicity/one-religion state. But when a state is arbitrarily and/or constitutionally set up legally with such parameters, it seems to carry quite other and ultimately not helpful messages — perhaps to itself as much as to neighbors and the globe at large. I believe Israel was the first time in history that a state was ‘carved out’ and established, created, for the express purpose of being a haven for one ethnicity, one religion. (I’m probably unaware or forgetting some prior example in history, but Israel is certainly in our era the example.) And, on balance, I think a lot of observers have serious reason to question the long-term (as well as short-term) effects of that. And it was also crafted/set up by outsiders. (I realize of course this is a can of worms I’m raising, but perhaps precisely so: Whatever Americans advocate now for Iraq, be it segregated cantons or whatever, we ARE in can-of-worms territory, as was predictable long before Bush ever pried open this Pandora’s Box.)
As to the now-constitutionally-endorsed ‘federalism’ for Iraq, as you note, I think a problem is that there are degrees of federalism and ways of manifesting it — the US has a ‘federal’ system but something considerably short of the degree of autonomousness that Biden seems to be calling for, if only in the sense that our brand of federalism would never allow for ethnic/religious segregation (aka “cleansing”) by state. (Even Utah couldn’t do that, regardless of being our closest example of a de facto primary-religion state.)
In other words, an issue here is who it is that gets to – or should be – interpreting the degree and form of federalism in Iraq.
Hi, Robert. Thanks for your response.
I find the distinction between “influence” and “impose” a disingenuous one. We are an occupying army. We have no influence that is not based upon force of arms.
To say that Iraqis owe us a hearing because U.S. lives are at risk after we invaded and occupied the country, after we created the conditions under which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who would otherwise be alive are dead, under which nearly 20% of the population are internal or external refugees is, charitably put, equally disingenuous; it bears unfortunate similarities to the attitude that got us there to begin with.
You ask, “is it our job to impose a unified central government with a president Maliki backed by 160,000 Americans?” Of course not. Nor is it our job to force Maliki out, which appears to be where we’re headed. It’s not our job to be there at all, and it’s not our job to maintain the occupation during the three or four years between now and when, if all went perfectly well, a Biden plan could be implemented.
You’re misreading the plan when you say it calls for a combined U.S.-international force of 20,000; it calls for international peacekeepers — the number isn’t specified but the numbers I suggested are based upon recognized formulae — and 20,000 U.S. troops. Only in the context of a nearly 200,000-strong occupying army can a force of 20,000 troops wih a combat mission be considered “residual.” Do you see anything in the various articulations of the Biden plan that says of that troop presence, “if the Iraqi government concurs?” I don’t. Do Iraqis owe us that “right” as well?
Biden isn’t the only person pointing to pre-British Mandate Iraq as a model, but it’s a meaningless comparison: among other things, the Sunni minority dominated the country, which at that time included what is now Kuwait (a point Saddam relied on as justification for his invasion of that country). About the only valid point of comparison is that then, as now, Iraq’s governments operated courtesy of a foreign power.
I won’t reiterate the practical objections. Regarding Biden’s endorsement of ethnic cleansing: whether or not he endorses it as a goal, he’s endorsing it as an outcome.
Zinya-
Thank you for your very thoughtful comments. I think I understand (or at least hope it to be the case) that WB is not saying that Biden, and others advocting for a “soft partition,” are also advocating genocide. But it’s pretty hard to get around the actual definition of “ethnic cleansing” (American Heritage Dictionary- The systematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide.) Given the fact that the title to this article doesn’t make the distinction that you do, and that the actual definition explicitly refers to genocide, and the most common usage of the term over the past 20 years always refers to genocide- I find it hard to believe that WB was being as nuanced as you give him credit for.
WB-
You still don’t answer the central question. What is your plan? What is anyone’s plan beyond staying the course or complete withdraw regardless of the political situation in Iraq? You say that Biden is endorsing ethnic cleansing as an “outcome.” If the outcome you are so concerned with is the “sytematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide” then it seems clear that outcome has already arrived- Read NY Times April 20, 2007: “US Erects Bahgdad Wall To Keep Sects Apart.” This should have never been necessary. If we had gone into iraq with a modicum of planning and any understanding of the ramifications of our actions we wouldn’t be building walls right now. Better yet if we never had gone in the first place we would probably be discussing wheher or not the US is spending too much money building schools in Afghanistan (i would hope). It is not an ideal situation, but it is the situation this incompetent and arrogant President has left us with. Giving each of the three main sects a chance to allow for cooler heads to prevail by separating the parties seems far more humane than simply letting them have at it.
To be clear- I dont think the Iraqi’s owe us anything. I believe the opposite actually. I believe we owe the Iraqis. I believe that this is an unjust war, and one that we should never have embarked upon. I, unlike many others, listened to Sen.s Lugar and Biden when they warned before the invasion that if we went to Iraq we should be prepared to stay 10 years as an occupying force (read the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report “The Ten Years After” 2002). I also believe that we need to leave Iraq as soon as possible. Therefore, I ask myself the obvious question- how do we “get out” as fast as possible so we don’t have to “go back?” That’s a fairly selfish American question- one that doesn’t even take into account the humanitarian question of how we best leave to avoid ethnic cleansing/ genocide. I happen to believe that the only plan I have heard of so far that could work is the Biden- Gelb plan. Historically,the only other options that have worked are- 1) to install a dictator (how ironic that woud be), 2) pick sides as we leave and let one side obliterate the other or 3) send more troops and occupy Iraq as an imperial power would. None of the above seem to be viable options if the goal is to avoid having to return. Maybe you are saying that it is inevitable that we will return and we should merely cut our losses now and prepare for the regional war that is likely to ensue. Well, I have a 7 year old and a 9 year old, and I would rather be accused of supporting an imposed partition in Iraq than be accused of leaving the problem for their generation in the form of a draft.
As for your other points:
1. Biden is not pointing to pre-British mandate as a “model.” Rather he and Gelb and others are merely pointing out to those not so steeped in history as yourself that Iraq in its current form came about through British imposition not some natural amalgamation of the current disparate indigeneous population largely dominated by three distinct ethno-religious groups.
2. Thank you for pointing out the error regarding 20,000 International and US troops- I meant to write an International force along with 20,000 US Troops.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues. I wish more people took the time to actually be engaged enough to even know what the Biden- Gelb plan is, let alone know enough to make saliant arguments as to why it may not work.
the Democratic side, the go-to guy is often Lugar’s opposite number on the Senate foreign relations committee, current chairman and presidential candidate Joe Biden, who has been praised by some in the community for his plan, developed in conjunction with Council on Foreign Relations president emeritus Leslie Gelb, to split the country into federal regions under a miraculously empowered strong central government. Biden describes it as an Iraqi version of the Dayton Accords, in which the U.S. imposed a “soft partition” plan upon the fractious children — “We even allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies…” of Bosnia.
This is at best a childish way to critique a serious plan for solving the morass we find ourselves in, in Iraq. The title alone is enough to disgust anyone. I’ll get to that below, first I will address the substance of the post.
He says the plan is consistent with the end goal of having a strong but limited central government in Baghdad. That is, he is actually calling for decentralization of Iraq, except in matters of common interest. These are border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues. The real power, for administering the regions would devolve to Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds under their own regional governments. The example of Kurdistan is illustrative in this regard. To clarify, this means that each region would be in charge of their internal security, meaning police forces, and likely some military component. That means, no National Iraqi Police, at most, the Central government would have a military in charge of safeguarding the nation’s borders, and nothing else. In other words, indigenous forces native to each region would form the core their respective security apparatus. This would alleviate one of the most problematic aspects of the current scheme where Shiite militias have large infiltrated the police forces of the country. This has allowed them to expand their reach to Sunni regions where they have exacted violence on the local Sunni population, thereby further alienating them from the Iraqi state. By separating them, and allowing each region to control its own security, it gives them enough breathing space to rebuild and invest in their own future.
The plan has a number of philosophic and practical flaws, beginning with the assumptions that the U.S. has both the right and the capacity to impose a particular form of government upon Iraqis.
We don’t. However, Biden’s plan is not so much an imposition on Iraqis, as it is a recognition of what is happening on the ground. The NYT and other outlets have recently reported that internal displacement has increased since the surge, meaning that cities and regions that were once ethnically mixed are now far more homogenous that was the case even a few months ago. In other words, that partitioning is already happening, and violently. Biden’s plan recognizing what is already happening and that its reversal is unlikely, seeks to establish a framework that would among other things, stop the violence. Yes, the segregation of the ethnic, religious groups would continue, but peacefully. That is a better alternative than what is going now.
Additionally, do you really want to argue that we don’t have the responsibility of minimizing the violence in the country and of trying to prevent an even larger calamity just because the initial invasion was wrong? That’s like saying that if you start a fire, because you started it, you don’t have the right to try to out it out. What happened, happened. Now we have to find a way to ameliorate it, to prevent an even bigger calamity. You argue for letting Iraqis sort it out, but the conditions for Iraqis to settle this own their own, does not exist. Unless of course, by that you mean, allowing them to slaughter each other until one side emerges victorious. That is what would happen should the US withdraw without any thought to the aftermath. If that is what you are saying, it looks to me like you are the one advocating genocide and a violent one at that. (See that accusation can go both ways)
Biden argues that because Iraq’s constitution already provides for federalization, his plan calls for no more than institutionalizing something that Iraqis have already agreed to in principle. In practice, though, the federal model, which would add semi-autonomous Shiite and Sunni regional federations to the existing Kurdish one, is opposed not only by most Sunnis, who would be left with resource-poor west-central Iraq for their fiefdom (with none of the ccountry’s 10 largest cities), and who nearly succeeded in scuttling the constitution because of the issue, but by Shia power broker and ardent nationalist Moqtada al Sadr and his millions of followers.
SCIRI, or whatever they call themselves now and its leadership have been calling for a move to semi-autonomous regions. They want a Shiiite region similar to the Kurdish one. You are right, however that al Sadr would oppose such a move, largely because Baghdad is the seat of his power. It is a point of contention I also have with Biden’s plan and one I hope he addresses a bit more.
That said, with regard to the Sunni region, you give the Shiites the south, the Kurds the North and the Sunnis are left by default with the west and center of the country, except for the federal cities. Currently, the Sunnis have begun to realize that re-taking control of the country is not feasible at this point, that is part of the reason why they have begun changing sides and moving against AQI. They view the Shiites and their militias as the biggest threat, not the US. A soft-partition, would give the Sunnis something they have sought for quite some time, a respite from the Shiite militias that have infiltrated the National Police and Army. Now this does not happen in a vacuum. That is why Sen. Biden also calls for more pressure on the central government to pass the oil revenue law. The oil law would give Sunnis 20 percent of all current and future revenue. The Sunnis can be coaxed into accepting the agreement because they get two things, security from the Shiite militias, and revenue to rebuild and provide for their population.
It is true that the leadership of the various parties are not monolithic, but the main problem right now is the violence between Sunnis and Shiites. That is the source of much of the instability in Iraq. By creating these regions, the onus will be on their respective leadership factions to not only provide for their population security, but also economic development. The Kurds are already doing it. The Shiites, though they have fought each other periodically due to the competition between SCIRI, and al Sadr’s movement, are more likely to reorganize in their region to provide for their population. The reason, it will be harder for them to legitimize the violence without Sunnis to fight. Additionally, the under the Biden plan, the US is not just going to divide the three regions, and say, okay, now go and do what you will. Rather, the point of this plan is to reduce the violence to a manageable level (ethnic/religious violence) so that other international players would be more willing to contribute to a peacekeeping force. In addition, reducing the violence would allow for an increase in FDI and for the creation of jobs and opportunities for Iraqis.
Additionally, the US would not be the only power broker that is why Biden calls for convening, with the U.N., a regional security conference where Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran, pledge to support Iraq’s power sharing agreement and respect Iraq’s borders. He also calls for “creat[ing] a standing Contact Group, to include the major powers, that would engage Iraq’s neighbors and enforce their commitments.” This means not only Iran, and Syria, but also Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The mechanisms for doing so would range from carrots to sticks. If anything, such a diplomatic effort would not only give us a chance to stabilize Iraq, but would also open the door to further engagement with Iran, and away from the neo-con wet dream of invading that country as well.
Finally, on this subject of the militias, Biden also says that allowing the militias to continue to exist even in their own regions would only be “an interim solution, because no nation can sustain itself peacefully with private armies. Over time, if a political settlement endures, the militia would be incorporated into regional and national forces, as is happening in Bosnia.”
He says that minorities in the large mixed-population cities, which include Baghdad and, most problematically, Kirkuk, would be protected by international peace-keeping forces. But Baghdad, which Biden would designate a federal city, the capital of the federation, has more than five million residents and would require a peacekeeping force of more than 100,000. Kirkuk, which is the object of a fierce contest between its growing Kurdish population and the various non-Kurdish residents, has a population of more than a million, requiring a peacekeeping force of more than 20,000. Mosul’s mixed population of more than 2 million dictates a peacekeeping force of more than 40,000. Basra is more homogenous, but the city is riven by fighting between rival Shia factions, and its population of about two million includes more than 100,000 Sunnis and smaller numbers of Assyrians, Christians and other ethnic or sectarian minorities: add another 40,000 peacekeepers, and assume the militias would be more tolerant of them than of the undermanned British forces in the area.
Here I’ll just quote Biden: “The essence of the Plan is that mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is truly satisfied with the overall arrangement. If so, that leadership will help keep the peace in the cities. At the same time, we would make Baghdad a federal city, and buttress the protection of minorities there and in the other mixed cities with an international peacekeeping force. Right now, the prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more likely to participate, including countries like Saudi Arabia which have offered peacekeepers in the past.”
In other words, he is not saying that all of this will magically happen; rather he is acknowledging that it will take a lot of hard work, because “mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is truly satisfied with the overall arrangement.” That means, that he envisions an active engagement by the US and the Contact Group in order to reach this point. He is not saying the US will impose it and Iraqis will accept it. He is saying, let’s do what this administration has failed to do and engage all of Iraq’s neighbors and other Great powers to come up with a deal that the parties in Iraq can accept. The peacekeeping force will not so much be the main guarantor of security but would be a supplement the central government’s security forces.
I, myself, have always envisioned Biden’s plan working better if he takes his nation wide approach down to the local level in missed cities as well, in essence separating the most contentious groups from one another and allowing them to administer their sub-regions within each city to reduce the incentive for, and level of violence. Still, I partially agree that more needs to be spelled out on this front.
While you make a huge deal of the fact that a large number of peace-keepers will be needed, I again ask you, what would the alternative be? One of the biggest problems with the manner in which this administration has run the war is its refusal to admit that we needed a larger force in the country. Biden’s plan offers a better way, negotiate to bring about an agreement that can be accepted by the parties, separate them to reduce the level of violence in the country, and once you establish the conditions for a larger peacekeeping force, engage with other powers to provide them. He acknowledges that with the current situation, that is unlikely, but change the dynamic and actually create the conditions that give way for a peace to keep, and more nations are likely to contribute.
I disagree with him that Saudi, and other Iraqi neighbors should make up a part of that force because I see them as creating too much instability. However, we can call on the two powers that stand to benefit most from stable, oil producing Iraq, India and China. China is already entering the country and signing deals for oil exploration (including in the Sunni provinces) so they already have a reason for wanting to be there. The only way they can benefit from the oil and deals they sign is if Iraq stabilizes. Make them an offer, and see where it goes. They have the man power, and they are coming to the region militarily for the same reasons we are there. Instead of viewing them as a threat, welcome them as an ally. Same goes for India, they have the man power and are in dire need of additional energy supplies.
Please point to where in Biden’s plan, he calls for an international peacekeeping force on Iraq’s borders. I don’t believe that is the case, since he assigns this task specifically to the central government. At most, we would have observers to ensure that all Iraqi neighbors were keeping their end of the bargain as outlined above.
You say that a “practical arguments against Biden’s plan is that another 15 months will have passed before Bush is gone and a new president could even begin the enormous diplomatic effort required to implement it under the best of circumstances,” however, given current trends that may make the implementation of the plan a lot easier, because as I noted, reports emerging from Iraq are that cities and regions are becoming more homogenous due to the ethnic/religious violence.
That would postpone a substantial U.S. drawdown until early in 2010, and even Biden thinks more than a year would be required; he published the plan in May of 2006, and envisioned its completion, as noted above, in the summer of 2008 — two years on.
Yes, it would, however you fail to mention what would happen if this is not done. There is a great likely hood that Iraq’s instability and violence will spill beyond its borders. That means, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and others will get involved and the ensuing conflict will create an even larger morass than the one we are in now. This would require an even more massive American (and international) effort. This, without mentioning the effect a regional war would have on the global economy once China, India and others begin to suffer from oil shortages. If they aren’t in the region now militarily, they will come in at that point. Also, as you note none of this is likely to happen until January 2009, meaning that a new president will be in power. Given the world’s view of President Bush, they would welcome a new administration and be more willing to listen to such a plan.
Excellent, thoughtful contributions from Robert and NYkrinDC. I appreciate your site, NYkr – I have a fondness for voices crying in the wilderness.
To NYkr: The details of Biden’s plan – of any plan – cannot be anything but fluid right now, so I won’t try to weigh in on that. I said above that if the Iraqis want a federal republic, that’s up to them, not us or Joe Biden.
I have two problems with your argument: One is that Biden and the U.S. have no standing to be pushing any kind of plan for the governance of Iraq. We lost any claim to moral rectitude a long time ago; our dirty hands should have no influence in shaping Iraq’s political future. I think Biden does himself and Iraq a disservice by continuing to belabor the issue.
Where Biden is right is on the absolute need for very strong, focused diplomacy. But as WB says, this pathetic excuse for an American government shows no sign yet of wanting to pursue the only course that has a chance of remedying what we’ve wrought in Iraq. This brings up the second problem I have with your argument: In your closing paragraphs you seem willing to live with another 15 months of Bush intransigence, mass killings in Iraq, and continuing deaths and maimings of American soldiers. Your entire post reflects your moral indignation with this horrible war and with the possibility of it persisting for the remainder of Bush’s term, so I know you want to see an immediate, forceful diplomatic campaign from the administration. Yet you realize this isn’t going to happen, so I infer you’re resigned to having things continue as they are until a new administration enters the White House.
I’m inferring again – maybe projecting – when I say that this prospect is what offends WB the most: war, death and destruction for the next 15 months. I don’t know if WB agrees with me, but I see Biden and other American political leaders as promoting the continuation of our violent occupation by the simple fact of their refusal to call for rapid withdrawal of American forces. When Biden presents this “plan,” he’s really wasting time and encouraging war. He should be throwing his considerable foreign policy weight behind a plan for sooner-rather-than-later withdrawal, accompanied by the energetic diplomatic effort that is another major facet of his plan. I’ve been saying for some time that Iraq’s neighbors should be involved in peacekeeping – I figured fellow Arabic-speaking forces would be best, but your proposal for Chinese and Indian participation is intriguing.
But for me the bottom line is that Biden wants to pursue the diplomatic approach, taking the time to virtually nail down an agreement for partition, before we start leaving Iraq. I think this is wrong-headed and a guarantee that the war will continue as is until the end of Bush’s blighted term, and into the opening months or years of the next administration. This to me is beyond unacceptable.
We’ve got to undertake diplomacy and withdrawal simultaneously. This is where Congress comes in, and where the need for strong Democratic leadership is most essential. That’s the kind of leadership we’re not seeing from Pelosi or Reid. Congress must force the initiation of withdrawal and diplomacy, and it can do this by exerting its constitutional control over funding of the war; it must either cut off the money entirely, or it must make funding conditional on the kind of diplomatic effort Biden and others are proposing.
There is simply no other way, and I’m very sorry to say that with the current Democratic leadership, that way seems unattainable. I don’t know how to get the absolute necessity of such a diplomatic-military process across to the dense, fearful minds who run the Democratic Party in Congress, and so I don’t have much hope that anything will change for the better in Iraq until Bush leaves office – in other words, another 15 months of more of the same, as you envision. But it’s essential that the Democrats at least try; those efforts,well-publicized and explained, could go a long way to mobilizing public opinion to force Bush to back down and do the right thing for once in his miserable life.
Robert, the Levin amendment was written in a way that would have allowed the admininstration to determine how many troops were necessary to carry out the specified missions; at best, it would have resulted in a “withdrawal” to January’s troop levels. I won’t be too surprised if that’s what transpires anyway, given the parlous state of the Army. My objection to it was broadly the same as one of my objections to the partition plan: it would have continued the U.S. occupation indefinitely.
Regarding what we owe Iraqis or they us, I was referencing your quote from Biden to the effect that American lives on the line confer the right to guide events.
When I said “ethnic cleansing,” I did so advisedly.
A Plan: announce we’e getting out, offer to do wha we can for anyone who wants us to.
I said above that if the Iraqis want a federal republic, that’s up to them, not us or Joe Biden.
I think Sen. Biden would agree with you. The point of his plan is not to permanently partition the country, or impose on Iraqis a permanent condition. Rather, the point of Sen. Biden’s plan is to give each side enough space to allow tensions/violence to calm down a bit, allow them to focus on their own internal problems (i.e. security, the welfare of the population) while also giving the parties the respite needed to work through the political process that has so far been stalled and which will ultimately determine the future of the country.
The main reason for Sen. Biden’s plan are his views (based on the balkan experience) of the different ways in which civil wars can be stopped. He argues that there are only three ways in which civil wars can be stopped. The first is to either set up or allow for the rise of a dictator or strongman who can bring the masses under his reign. The second, is to allow the civil war to continue until one side emerges victorious. The third, and the one he is advocating, is to separate the warring parties, establish a peace keeping presence and give them enough of a respite from the violence so that they can eventually return to the negotiating table to work out the details of their future as a country.
One of the things which I find problematic in the arguments I’ve seen here, is the conflating of two different conflicts in Iraq. WB and Monfort seem to suggest that the biggest reason behind the fighting in Iraq is the American presence. I don’t totally disagree, I think our occupation is a large part of the problem over the long term. However, there is another problem that has emerged and that is the very real conflict in Iraq between Shiites and Sunnis, and to a lesser extent the Kurds, and other minorities like the Turkomen who have sided with the Sunnis.
If we were only dealing with the occupation, I would agree that having US troops withdraw completely would be the fastest and best way to resolve the problem. However, being that there is an actual civil war in Iraq, our leaving would alleviate one source of instability while giving free rein to the other.
That is, yes, the US withdrawing from Iraq would mean that violence against Americans in Iraq would end. Our people in uniform would no longer be targets in the country. However, think about what we would leave behind. A civil conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the heart of the Muslim world. A conflict that has the potential to embroil not just Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Kuwait and others, affecting not only the region but also the global economy.
In short, Sen. Biden is not so much pushing a permanent plan for governance in Iraq, he himself acknowledges that his plan would only be an interim solution that would pave the way for Iraqis to work things out among themselves.
In your closing paragraphs you seem willing to live with another 15 months of Bush intransigence, mass killings in Iraq, and continuing deaths and maimings of American soldiers. Your entire post reflects your moral indignation with this horrible war and with the possibility of it persisting for the remainder of Bush’s term, so I know you want to see an immediate, forceful diplomatic campaign from the administration. Yet you realize this isn’t going to happen, so I infer you’re resigned to having things continue as they are until a new administration enters the White House.
In the paragraph on the next fifteen months I was not resigning myself to what will continue to happen in Iraq until Bush leaves office. Rather I was addressing Weldon’s argument that because nothing will happen within the next fifteen months Sen. Biden’s plan in from a practical point of view, unfeasible. I was merely pointing out that in the worst case scenario, that nothing happens within the next 15 months, given current trends Sen. Biden’s plan would be easier to implement since large areas of Iraq will be largely homogenous. I’m not willing to live through another 15 months of the violence, rather I think we should continually push for change. However, the reality is that in order to have a shot at changing this intransigent administration is to have broad bi-partisan support. Sen. Biden’s plan has been welcomed by members of both parties, and even by the UN security council.
what offends WB the most: war, death and destruction for the next 15 months. I don’t know if WB agrees with me, but I see Biden and other American political leaders as promoting the continuation of our violent occupation by the simple fact of their refusal to call for rapid withdrawal of American forces. When Biden presents this “plan,” he’s really wasting time and encouraging war.
I understand that, but things are not that simple. You say that what offends you the most is the “war, death and destruction [continuing] for the next 15 months.” The thing is, that is going to happen and be even more bloody if American troops withdraw. The only thing stopping the Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq from going after each other full throttle is the US army. Take us out of the picture and the violence we see now will be nothing compared to what follows. The only way, your quote above makes sense is if you mean, “war, death and destruction” for American forces or committed by American forces, which is a very narrow view of what is going on in Iraq today.
That said, I am not arguing that we should stay. Like Sen. Biden I think that we need to start withdrawing. However, before doing so we need to set the conditions not only to allow for our withdrawal, but also to prevent the worst possible outcome once we leave. As Sen. Obama says, there are no good options in Iraq, just bad and worst ones. To me, Sen. Biden’s plan which seeks to reduce the level of violence and establish the conditions for an eventual political settlement between Iraqis in the future, is a bad outcome, because it means that we will take a little longer bringing our troops home. However, the worst outcome, would be to withdraw without looking to the consequences of that withdrawal, or even trying to ameliorate them prior to our departure. Such a move would be comparable, in my view, to the Bush administration’s biggest mistake in Iraq. they prepared for war, but did nothing to prepare for its aftermath. To me, the calls for an immediate withdrawal are no better than that because they focus too much on the short term goal, without paying too much heed to the attendant consequences.
“He should be throwing his considerable foreign policy weight behind a plan for sooner-rather-than-later withdrawal, accompanied by the energetic diplomatic effort that is another major facet of his plan.”
That is what he is doing, but he is trying to bring about the conditions that would allow for it. The experience of the Brits right now is illustrative of this point. They decided to withdraw from southern Iraq, without establishing the conditions for such a withdrawal. As they withdraw, not only are they seeing everything they had worked so hard to achieve, crumble, but also a rise in violence between Shiite groups vying for power to fill the vacuum left by the British. At the same time, as the Brits withdraw from each of their bases, the others come under increasing attack, and their casualties have actually skyrocketed since they began their planned withdrawal. The reason for this, they focused too much on the short term goal of withdrawing, without paying heed to the consequences of that withdrawal, or even establishing conditions for it that would have allowed it, or ameliorated the bad consequences that followed.
At the same time, the Brits have come under increasing criticism for not having planned well and for leaving behind Iraqi employees who have now become targets for the various militias, along with their families.
I’ve been saying for some time that Iraq’s neighbors should be involved in peacekeeping – I figured fellow Arabic-speaking forces would be best, but your proposal for Chinese and Indian participation is intriguing.
I disagree with having neighboring countries be the main component of any peace-keeping force. The reason, is that that would mean that both Saudi Arabia and Iran would be involved and that is the last thing we need. Both countries are stoking the fires in Iraq, because they are fighting a proxy war for control of the region there. Having their troops on the ground in Iraq, would only lead us on the road to Lebanon. The US suggested such a move following the invasion of the country, and Iraqis almost to a man rejected it. The reason for this, is as I mentioned above, but also because Iraqis despised their Arab neighbors for kowtowing to Saddam Hussein, applauding him and supporting him even as they suffered under his reign.
But for me the bottom line is that Biden wants to pursue the diplomatic approach, taking the time to virtually nail down an agreement for partition, before we start leaving Iraq.
You are thinking about a permanent partition here. Sen. Biden is only talking about an interim solution whose ultimate objective is to allow the parties to eventually engage one another in negotiations to decide the future of the country. He wants a respite to the violence, along with intensive diplomacy to get Iraq’s neighbors to stop meddling, while also expanding responsibility for the future of the country beyond the US, and to the international community who in turn will safeguard the agreements reached. That, along with a steady replacement (once the interim partition is shown to reduce violence) of US troops with international peace-keeping forces, is the essence of Sen. Biden’s plan.
it must either cut off the money entirely, or it must make funding conditional on the kind of diplomatic effort Biden and others are proposing.
Such a move won’t matter if Democrats can’t get Republicans to jump ship. Besides, it leaves unaddressed the issue of “what then?” The Congress forces the withdrawal of American troops, then what? Sen. Biden’s plan, on the other hand has been gaining momentum not only within Congress, but also abroad (including the UN Security Council). Get enough Democrats and Republicans to support it, and it can be imposed on the President. More importantly, it does address the issue above, because it provides a specific plan of action.
A Plan: announce we’e getting out, offer to do wha we can for anyone who wants us to.
Read above to see why that would be an even worst solution that Sen. Biden’s plan.
New Yorker in DC:
I share the sentiments Montfort expressed of appreciation for your hearty contributions here. I have one key question your argument seems in large part to rest on: Do you have any evidence to suggest that US military presence there has done anything to date to mitigate the civil war? Why do you think the civil-war aspects of this struggle (which I don’t think anyone here is ignoring) would be — or are now — somehow reined in by US presence?
We tore the lid off Pandora’s civil-war box there ourselves, and I see no signs that our presence has done anything since our instigative catalyzing to hold any of it in check.
I haven’t made it through your whole post yet but anticipate interruption any minute so I’m posting this already but may have more response later to the rest of your post…
Zinya,
For one, it has prevented the Shiites from launching a full scale assault against the Sunnis. So far, most of the violence has been limited to militias and death squads, which while successful to an extent, also have to contend with American forces trying to protect the civilian population. American forces have faced Shiite militias many times over, and have freed many Iraqi Sunnis held captive in the militias’ secret prisons. In fact, despite Abu Ghraib, Iraqi Sunnis prefer to be captured by American forces, and held in American run facilities because they know that their treatment at the hand of the Shiites would be far worst. Additionally, every time there has been an attack that was intended to stoke ethnic/religious conflict, it has been American troops at the forefront of reestablishing order, and enforcing curfews (passed by the Iraqi government) for the purpose of preventing the additional bloodshed that would ensue due to revenge attacks.
Remember, in Iraq we are involved in more than one conflict, and as such, our strategy needs to take these into account. That is part of the reason why I like Biden’s approach, because it recognizes that more than just a war against occupation, Iraq is also going through more than just one conflict, indeed, these are some of the most pressing: Iran v. Saudi Arabia, Iran v. US, Kurds v. Turkey, Iran v. Kurds, Shiites v. Sunnis, Shiites v. Shiites, Kurds v. Shiites/Sunnis/ Turkomen, etc. which ironically, though our actions caused it, our forces have prevented from escalating into something far worse. An an example, it has been the US military presence in Iraq that has moderated Turkey’s response, and made them reticent to invade northern Iraq with a full scale attack to destroy the PKK. Same thing goes for Iran and Syria, who worry about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan more than anything else.
We all agree that the manner in which this administration has conducted this war is directly responsible for most of the problems in the country. However, it is also true that once in, AQI, and other groups stoked ethnic and religious conflict as a means of making our task more difficult. They succeeded in this, and despite the fact that our actions, along with AQI are responsible, it does not mean, that these new conflicts don’t actually exist. They may have done it to make the administration’s plan more difficult, but the conflicts they started have taken on a life of their own. If anything, they are a bigger threat to Iraqis than even our occupation of the country has been.
Conditions in Iraq are such that moderate Iraqis have had to flee, or have been silenced by the more militant members of each sect (including Ayatollah Sistani). Once we leave, these two groups will likely drive their respective groups into an all out war for control of the state. It is that scenario that Sen. Biden’s plan seeks to address. He, like most Americans wants to end this conflict, but like anything in this war, there is a bad way, and a worst way (no good ones are left).
Sen. Biden’s son will be shipped to Iraq early next year, as such he has every reason to want to bring the troops home. However, he also understands that just withdrawing without trying to prevent a larger calamity will mean that the situation we leave, while bad, will become much worst (as outlined in my previous comments).
NYkr: Congressional imposition of a foreign policy initiative upon the executive branch is difficult under the best of circumstances. It is simply impossible with the current administration. One cannot legally compel the secretary of state to conduct foreign policy on behalf of Congress, or compel the president to direct her to do so, or compel the president to hire people capable of doing so. Congress could pass laws prohibiting some foreign policy activities, as per the Boland Amendment, but the administration is awash in people who think Boland was unconstitutional and Iran-Contra was legal. And even if it weren’t, can you genuinely conceive of circumstances under which Bush will surrender his legitimately constitutional right to direct foreign policy to a Democrat?
So, no: if the Biden plan is to be attempted, it will have to wait until January of 2009, and the U.S. will have to perpetuate the occupation for however long it takes to conduct the diplomacy and raise the peacekeeping force.
In Bosnia, that was 19 peacekeepers per 1,000Bosnians. I suggested that at least 200,000 peacekeepers would be required in Iraq, and that’s only half what the ideal ratio calls for, and that’s only if one subtracts the Kurdish population from the equation on the not necessarily sound assumption that they can keep their own peace in places like Mosul or Kirkuk, or that their manner of keeping the peace will be palatable to the international community.
Where on earth will we find somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 peacekeepers? And how will we maintain the U.S. presence in the interim, given the state of the Army? And what makes anyone think that whatever presence we can sustain will be particularly useful? We have completely failed to meet any of the obligations an occupying power incurs; are we suddenly going to turn things around for that 2 years during which the plan will be implemented?
I don’t think there’s a prayer that Sunnis will agree to become dependents of the Kurdish and Shia federal regions, which is what the plan calls for — they would have no oil, little tax base and none of the country’s 10 largest cities. Nor do I think the Sadrists will surrender their dream of a unified Iraq, or, on a more prosaic level, surrender the reality of controlling most of the commerce and real estate in Baghdad.
But even if those issues are somehow peacefully surmounted, the questions remain: what is it that the occupation is expected to accomplish during the interval between inauguration day and the day we finally manage to scrounge up that 200,000th or 400,000th peacekeeper?
Then too, I note that Maliki says we’re free to go if we wish and that he can find other friends. He’s the head of a sovereign government, right? The Biden “plan” seems to suggest that we’re not free to go no matter what he says and that he doesn’t really have friends who are legitimate and therefore we have to pay no attention to that man in front of the curtain who was elected by a bunch of purple fingered folk. Did I get that right?
Who, exactly, has the authority to get all of “them” into a room and not let “them” out until “they” agree? Sounds like making the temple’s quota in an Israel Funds drive but I don’t think there’s a rabbi there.
Weldon,
Congressional imposition of a foreign policy initiative upon the executive branch is difficult under the best of circumstances. It is simply impossible with the current administration. One cannot legally compel the secretary of state to conduct foreign policy on behalf of Congress, or compel the president to direct her to do so, or compel the president to hire people capable of doing so. Congress could pass laws prohibiting some foreign policy activities, as per the Boland Amendment, but the administration is awash in people who think Boland was unconstitutional and Iran-Contra was legal. And even if it weren’t, can you genuinely conceive of circumstances under which Bush will surrender his legitimately constitutional right to direct foreign policy to a Democrat?
Same thing can be said about your plan. After all, Congress withdrawing funding for the troops (exactly how the administration will frame the debate) is an imposition onto a prerogative that belongs to the executive.
the U.S. will have to perpetuate the occupation for however long it takes to conduct the diplomacy and raise the peacekeeping force.
That is going to happen with Biden’s plan or your own suggestion. As you note above, Congress cannot realistically impose a foreign policy on the executive branch, under the best of circumstances. At least Biden’s plan gets everyone thinking about the next steps and likely scenarios that will unfold in a manner that the simplistic “withdrawal plan” does not.
In Bosnia, that was 19 peacekeepers per 1,000Bosnians. I suggested that at least 200,000 peacekeepers would be required in Iraq, and that’s only half what the ideal ratio calls for, and that’s only if one subtracts the Kurdish population from the equation on the not necessarily sound assumption that they can keep their own peace in places like Mosul or Kirkuk, or that their manner of keeping the peace will be palatable to the international community.Where on earth will we find somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 peacekeepers? And how will we maintain the U.S. presence in the interim, given the state of the Army? And what makes anyone think that whatever presence we can sustain will be particularly useful? We have completely failed to meet any of the obligations an occupying power incurs; are we suddenly going to turn things around for that 2 years during which the plan will be implemented?
This is from my comments above:
Citing Biden’s plan: “Right now, the prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more likely to participate…”
This are my own thoughts supplementing his:
I have always envisioned Biden’s plan working better if he takes his nation wide approach down to the local level in mixed cities as well. In essence, separating the most contentious groups from one another and allowing them to administer their sub-regions within each city to reduce the opportunities, incentive for, and level of violence. Still, I partially agree that more needs to be spelled out on this front.Also, while you make a huge deal of the fact that a large number of peace-keepers will be needed, I again ask you, what would the alternative be? This considering that were the US to withdraw as you suggest, the ethnic cleansing will not only continue but would pick up pace, potentially engulfing the entire region. One of the biggest problems with the manner in which this administration has run the war is its refusal to admit that we needed a larger force in the country. Biden’s plan offers a better way, negotiate to bring about an agreement that can be accepted by the parties, separate them to reduce the level of violence in the country, and once you establish the conditions for a larger peacekeeping force, engage with other powers to provide them. He acknowledges that with the current situation, that is unlikely, but change the dynamic and actually create the conditions that give way for a peace to be kept, and more nations are likely to contribute. In other words, you have to work all the levers almost simultaneously for this to succeed.I disagree with him that Saudi, and other Iraqi neighbors should make up a part of that force because I see them as contributing to the instability in the country now, and even more so if they had troops/intelligence services on the ground. However, we can call on the two powers that stand to benefit the most from a stable, oil producing Iraq; India and China. China is already entering the country and signing deals for oil exploration (including in the Sunni provinces where it is believed there may be some reserves) so they already have a reason for wanting to be there. The only way they can benefit from the oil and deals they sign is if Iraq stabilizes. Make them an offer that takes into account their interests and power and it stands a better chance of success. They have the man power, and they are coming to the region militarily for the same reasons we are there. Instead of viewing them as a threat, welcome them as an ally. Same goes for India, they have the man power and are in dire need of additional energy supplies as well.
I don’t think there’s a prayer that Sunnis will agree to become dependents of the Kurdish and Shia federal regions, which is what the plan calls for — they would have no oil, little tax base and none of the country’s 10 largest cities. Nor do I think the Sadrists will surrender their dream of a unified Iraq, or, on a more prosaic level, surrender the reality of controlling most of the commerce and real estate in Baghdad.
The Sunnis want their fair share of oil revenue from the Iraqi state, there’s also been talk of building a pipeline through al Anbar to Jordan to ensure faster oil supplies to the Mediterrenean. Sunni tribes have been pushing for such investment and have guaranteed any future pipeline’s protection. As more time has passed, the Sunnis have also realized that they cannot regain the old Iraqi state, the best they can do is protect Sunni regions from encroachment by Shiite/Iranian influence. Yes, negotiations and hard diplomacy will be necessary, but there is a chance it can be done. Moreover, many of the most important cities like Baghdad would be federal in character, meaning no one sect will control it all. With equitable representation, the likelihood of Sunnis accepting it increases.
As for al Sadr, yes he will not want to surrender his dream of a united Iraqi state, but he will have to do this against the backdrop of the SCIRI/Badr organization’s drive for dominance in the south. That is where most of his resources are likely to go. Also, so long as Kirkuk is kept as a federal city, Sadr is less likely to cause trouble in the north.
what is it that the occupation is expected to accomplish during the interval between inauguration day and the day we finally manage to scrounge up that 200,000th or 400,000th peacekeeper
If anything, prevent the onset of a full fledged civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, same as it has been doing for some time. It’s either that, or withdraw and watch Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq tear each other apart from the sidelines, while Iran and Saudi become more involved in a proxy war in Iraq potentially engulfing the entire region.
Jack D,
I note that Maliki says we’re free to go if we wish and that he can find other friends. He’s the head of a sovereign government, right? The Biden “plan” seems to suggest that we’re not free to go no matter what he says and that he doesn’t really have friends who are legitimate and therefore we have to pay no attention to that man in front of the curtain who was elected by a bunch of purple fingered folk. Did I get that right?
First, Maliki has no support in Iraq, no base and no militia. The moment the US withdraws, he is toast. On another note, Biden’s plan does not suggest that Maliki ‘s few friends are not legitimate, rather he recognizes that Maliki and his advisor’s are not interested in establishing the conditions for a unitary Iraqi state. Rather, and this was obvious even as President Bush talked up the then new prime minister, Maliki is interested in only one thing and that is increasing and solidifying the power of Shiites. Still, even though he is trying to do just this, Shiites themselves do not really support him as a leader. Instead they see him as exactly the type of weak central authority that allows the Shiite region to do as it wants.
The Biden plan recognizes all of these trends better than most. It needs a lot of work, but from the many plans I’ve seen it comes closer to addressing some of the most pressing issues that we are likely to face in a responsible manner.
Who, exactly, has the authority to get all of “them” into a room and not let “them” out until “they” agree? Sounds like making the temple’s quota in an Israel Funds drive but I don’t think there’s a rabbi there.
The international community. That is a large part of why Biden focuses so much on diplomacy and creating new mechanisms for pressing the Iraqis to negotiate with one another. It’s either that, or you let the war burn, in which case everything Weldon is arguing (and using agaisnt Biden’s plan) will happen, but on a more horrific scale, and rather than be directly engaged the US would just watch from the sidelines. In short, the very genocide that Weldon says he wants to avoid.
NYrinDC,
My problem is that, so far, these seem to me to be just assertions:
When Americans on a daily basis are also screwing up royally (which is NOT originally the soldiers’ fault but Bush’s for putting them there, although clearly some of our military have egregiously aggravated the situation) — killing innocent civilians on all sides of the conflict, not just Abu Ghraib but the “stoking” of hatreds via such incidents as daily checkpoint trigger fingers, mis-targetings of bombs, and then add atop that some of our military raping and murdering – it doesn’t take very many such incidents for us to have stoked a generalized complete distrust by all Iraqis in everyone. So, even if starting the evaluation only at the point of already being in there, as your argument does, to say that our presence has only mitigated (rather than aggravated every bit as much as it has ‘mitigated’, depending on which incidents you choose to look at), and that we have made things better than they otherwise would have been by staying and continuing now to stay … Well, I think you have no basis for concluding that our presence has kept any sort of lid on vs. what our departure would do.
e.g., How do you know what Sunnis prefer? (albeit given Sunni-Shi`ite hatreds, that particular comment is plausible but it’s just an assertion, still, because we really don’t know to what extent hatred of American occupation has equalled that sectarian centuries-old strife… That’s the thing about occupations: they tend to supplant internal hatreds.)
It is that scenario that Sen. Biden’s plan seeks to address. He, like most Americans wants to end this conflict, but like anything in this war, there is a bad way, and a worst way (no good ones are left).
I’m just curious: In some of your comments like this one, you sound a bit like Biden’s press secretary :-) … Are you?
p.s. to NYkrinDC,
I hadn’t seen your most recent post when I posted just now. So let me add a few more to my excerpts above. These too are comments that strike me as merely assertions (i.e., presumptions) — and ohhh how our asserted presumptions (the Bush/Cheney forté) have gotten us into morasses. (And some of your presumptions are even the same ones that Bush depends on):
For me, I just keep coming back to the fact — not assertion but history-lesson fact — that occupation by its very nature creates a situation wholly different (in some way or other) from what exists post-occupation. We cannot predict what the extraction of a “foreign other” — in this case ourselves — will do to the degrees of internal violence Iraqis are now doing to each other. Each nation is unique and so each occupation will have a slightly different (albeit always deleterious) effect and the occupation’s aftermath will also always be unique, in some unpredictable way(s). That’s my pov in this, and so using the assertion that a genocide will likely occur as a rationale for our own actions is just that, an assertion that is ultimately speculative, no matter where “things” seem to be pointing as long as we’re still in the mix. Suggesting it will inherently be worse without us ultimately does seem (ironically?) self-serving and too much an echo of Bush’s own self-righteous assertiveness that got us in this unholy mess. I’m not saying you’re wrong but rather than you cannot be certain you are right, and therefore arguments predicated on your “likely scenario” (and you do state it as sounding more than just ‘likely’ in your view) strike me as being founded in sand at least as much as the alternates being argued here.
Finally, re your own proposal:
I have always envisioned Biden’s plan working better if he takes his nation wide approach down to the local level in mixed cities as well. In essence, separating the most contentious groups from one another and allowing them to administer their sub-regions within each city to reduce the opportunities, incentive for, and level of violence.
Just how many cities do you see as becoming so administered?
NYker: there are two main reasons I make such a big deal about the number of peacekeepers, the first being that shorting the force would be fatal, the second that raising so many would be extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, which this can’t be construed to be.
200,000 peacekeeepers would be grossly inadequate by historical peacekeeping guidelines, but it would also be double the total number of UN peacekeepers now deployed throughout the world and nearly ten times the size of the largest UN peacekeeping force in history (the post-Dayton Bosnian peacekeeping force, less than a third as large, was primarily NATO, not UN). That’s an enormous, unprecedented logistical and financial challenge.
If, as you suggest, the bulk of the force were to be contributed by China and India — for the sake of argument, let’s say each contributed 25% of the force, with the other half coming from the Tyrell Corporation — then at the lower and almost certainly inadequate end, we’re looking at 50,000 Chinese troops in Iraq; at the upper, possibly adequate end, 100,000. Does anyone really want 50,000 Chinese troops there even if it could be arranged?
My objection to the plan is that it is fantasy. It’s a more rational fantasy than The Surge, but it’s still fantasy, and it’s getting in the way of facing up to the horrors of reality. It will never be implemented, but people will cling to it until the moment it becomes absolutely clear that it will never be implemented, and then we’ll be in the same position as now. Will terrible things happen if we withdraw? More than likely, but we are ultimately going to withdraw and there will not be a magical UN force coming in behind us, so we really, really need to focus on mitigating the disaster to whatever extent possible, which ultimately may not be much.
If the international community is to act as the coercive mediator who locks all the factions in a room, one has to wonder when that community will be created. We have the UN but the prospects of it acting effectively seem slim. I really don’t see this happening. If it is to be a conference of “interested” parties convened by the US, I don’t see this administration being proactive on it.
As to Maliki’s friends, he is talking about Iran I am sure. If the point of the “Biden plan” is to avoid a shia dominated and Iranian influenced Iraq, I think that, like the English king who demanded the tide stop, the plan seeks to overcome the inevitable.
Zinya,My problem is that, so far, these seem to me to be just assertions …
For one, it has prevented the Shiites from launching a full scale assault against the Sunnis. …Given the level of violence, mass executions of Sunnis by Shiites, I think it is clear that had they a completely free hand, Shiites (specifically the radical militias) would try to cleanse mixed areas of Sunnis. See here and here. My point with this is not to argue that we were not at fault for allowing the militias to infiltrate the security forces, rather I do this to point out that Sunnis indeed fear what I described above.
In fact, despite Abu Ghraib, Iraqi Sunnis prefer to be captured by American forces, and held in American run facilities because they know that their treatment at the hand of the Shiites would be far worst. In this article, a Sunni insurgent commander is described as follows: “Abu Sarhan’s views illustrate the deep animosity toward Shiites that fuels so much of the sectarian violence in Iraq. His comments also suggested a more restrained view of the United States, which he considers an occupier but one that should not leave immediately.”
Note that this article is from mid 2007. He also said this: “Still, he did not advocate an immediate U.S. withdrawal, but rather a gradual drawdown of troops to coincide with a reconciliation with Sunni insurgents.”Lift the barriers. Move the checkpoints. Build a hospital. And release the detainees from the area. And you will witness very quickly a tangible difference. The hatred and the strikes against the Americans will be wiped out or greatly reduced,” he said. “The solution is political, not military. And then the American soldiers will be able to walk down the streets without their protective vests. But when the Americans do eventually leave, he said, “the future will be dim.”
“There will be a fierce civil war, a grinding civil war, because Iran will always be there,” he said. “But the Sunnis are ready for such a day.”
Additionally, every time there has been an attack that was intended to stoke ethnic/religious conflict, it has been American troops at the forefront of reestablishing order, and enforcing curfews (passed by the Iraqi government) for the purpose of preventing the additional bloodshed that would ensue due to revenge attacks. Security forces have sealed off the area and imposed a curfew, in an effort to prevent revenge attacks.… Iraq is also going through more than just one conflict, …. which ironically, though our actions caused it, our forces have prevented from escalating into something far worse.
We’re fighting at least three different wars.An an example, it has been the US military presence in Iraq that has moderated Turkey’s response, and made them reticent to invade northern Iraq with a full scale attack to destroy the PKK. Same thing goes for Iran and Syria, who worry about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan more than anything else. There is no question that the US presence has moderated Turkey’s response. That said, it isn’t the only thing, Turkey’s own internal battles between the moderate Islamists and the secular military have also contributed, as well as Turkey’s desire to join the EU.They may have done it to make the administration’s plan more difficult, but the conflicts they started have taken on a life of their own. If anything, they are a bigger threat to Iraqis than even our occupation of the country has been.See some of the articles linked above, where Sunnis talk specifically about their readiness and willingness to fight the Iranian/Shiite threat. Abu Musab az Zarqawi, before his death, through the specific targeting of Shiite civilians and Shiite religious symbols ensured that the moderates within each side were drowned out by the the radicals that believed in Zarqawi’s vision. This is beyond dispute, particularly following the bombing of the al Askiriya mosque.Once we leave, these two groups will likely drive their respective groups into an all out war for control of the state.
Given the trends identified by some of the articles above, this is what is going on now. It’s not that I am arguing for Biden’s plan, so much as recognizing the trends and trying to find a plan that sees them as well, to see if we can ameliorate them to prevent a worst outcome.
I think you have no basis for concluding that our presence has kept any sort of lid on vs. what our departure would do.
Actually, as you can see from what even some Sunni commanders have said, despite everything they view the US occupation (even while calling for its end) as a means of preventing something even more calamitous.
See, I’m not arguing that the US hasn’t F-d-up royally, of course we have, that is why we are in the position we are in. My argument, is that having F-d-up so badly, it would be even worst to withdraw without a thought to the aftermath of our withdrawal. In short, two mistakes don’t make a right.
How do you know what Sunnis prefer? Again, see articles cited above.
That’s the thing about occupations: they tend to supplant internal hatreds.)
Yet, they haven’t. Sunnis and Shiites, in large part because of our inability to fill the security vacuum left by the demise of Hussein, has allowed for the rise for the most radical, violent elements of their societies to take over. Given that the violence between the groups is so intense even as they should all be coalescing against us, says something about a future Iraq without us, at least without trying to ameliorate any possible bad effects.
I’m just curious: In some of your comments like this one, you sound a bit like Biden’s press secretary :-) … Are you?
You caught me. Yes I am. Okay, no, I’m kidding. Actually, I was watching a video of Sen., Obama in the last debate where he said that and I used it in my response.
and ohhh how our asserted presumptions (the Bush/Cheney forté) have gotten us into morasses. (And some of your presumptions are even the same ones that Bush depends on)
The only thing I can say to that is, just because this administration has been almost criminal in using the reality on the ground, or threats we face as political tools to advance their political position, it doesn’t mean that some of what they have said is necessarily wrong. In fact, that has been one of my main problems with the administration, that in using the threats we face as a means of gaining political advantage, they have not only belittled those threats, but have made it possible for people to question whether those very real threats actually exist (i.e. all those conspiracy theories that say the US government/parts thereof planned 9/11).
As to main point regarding the likely outcome of a US withdrawal and ethnic cleansing spilling over Iraq’s borders
See above, for Iraqi Sunni-Shiite hatred, proxy war between Iran v Saudi Arabia and Sunni v Shiite Islam generally. Regarding With equitable representation, the likelihood of Sunnis accepting it increases. Also see articles linked above.
Also, so long as Kirkuk is kept as a federal city, Sadr is less likely to cause trouble in the north.
His aim is to prevent Kirkuk from becoming a city inside a future Kurdistan. Making it a federal (i.e. shared city) makes it more likely that he would acquiesce to such a plan, particularly given the threats he would face from the Badr brigade and Fadillah.
If anything, prevent the onset of a full fledged civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, same as it has been doing for some time. It’s either that, or withdraw and watch Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq tear each other apart from the sidelines, while Iran and Saudi become more involved in a proxy war in Iraq potentially engulfing the entire region.
Again, see above.
It’s either that, or you let the war burn, in which case everything Weldon is arguing (and using agaisnt Biden’s plan) will happen, but on a more horrific scale, and rather than be directly engaged the US would just watch from the sidelines. In short, the very genocide that Weldon says he wants to avoid.
Again, see above, and read other articles/reports that address the impact of an American withdrawal. To clarify, I’m not arguing against withdrawing, in fact I think we need to do so. However, I am worried about the aftermath of such an event. I see Biden’s plan (not the only one, but one of the few I think may work with modifications) as one that seeks to address this, something many of the other withdrawal plans do not. It’s simple, a power vacuum creates instability, instability allows for the rise of more radical elements. Given the situation in Iraq, that is almost a given. If I’m going to back a plan, I want it to address this eventuality as much as possible.
We cannot predict what the extraction of a “foreign other” — in this case ourselves — will do to the degrees of internal violence Iraqis are now doing to each other. Each nation is unique and so each occupation will have a slightly different (albeit always deleterious) effect and the occupation’s aftermath will also always be unique, in some unpredictable way(s).
Agreed. But in this case we are also responsible, so we have a responsibility (when we withdraw) to ensure that we address or try to prevent the worst possible outcomes that may ensue as a result. Otherwise, not only will we have invaded a country wrongly, but we would have left irresponsibly, further compounding our initial mistakes.
no matter where “things” seem to be pointing as long as we’re still in the mix
We have to identify trends. It isn’t hard to see where the situation in Iraq is headed, or will be heading. Just look at the British withdrawal from Southern Iraq. They are facing many problems, which we would also have to address when we begin to draw down our forces. That is what analysis is ultimately about. To say that all the killing/violence will stop with an American withdrawal, is more of an assertion than my own, because at least mine has trends and facts on the ground to point to as evidence.
Suggesting it will inherently be worse without us ultimately does seem (ironically?) self-serving and too much an echo of Bush’s own self-righteous assertiveness that got us in this unholy mess. I’m not saying you’re wrong but rather than you cannot be certain you are right, and therefore arguments predicated on your “likely scenario” (and you do state it as sounding more than just ‘likely’ in your view) strike me as being founded in sand at least as much as the alternates being argued here.
Again, this has been one of the worst crimes of this administration. In using real threats, realisitic scenarios not to explain or understand the problem, but solely for political points has created an atmosphere where it is hard for people to get past the experience under Bush and accept arguments about real threats at face value. I mean, I’m not arguing that my scenario is the only possible outcome out there. If it sounds like that, it is because I’m advocating it here so obviously I’m pointing to the evidence that supports it. That said, I am open to other scenarios so long as they have the evidence to back them up.
For example, Thomas P.M. Barnett, falls somewhere near Biden, but thinks that the way to go is to move our forces north to protect the Kurds, South to protect Kuwait, and allow the Sunnis and Shiites to go at each other, while also speeding up the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. He argues for this not because he wants to see the violence or the dead, but rather, because in the absence of any diplomacy, or engagement with Iran and an attempt to deal with the many problems we face, he sees this as the only solution to get everyone to the negotiating table. In other words, tire them or war, let it threaten them directly and only then push them to the negotiating table. He sees trends pointing that way, and backs it up. I see where he gets it, I think we can do better. I’ve read other plans which call for quarantining Iraq, and the violence inside it, but these usually fall along the lines of the mistaken belief that Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq have been fighting each other since the Battle of Karbala centuries ago. In short, a very occidental view of the Middle East and completely wrong.
Just how many cities do you see as becoming so administered?
Only those that are the source of a large amount of violence, Baghdad, Kirkuk, for example. I can’t name them all without researching this further…but given the ethnic/religious mix, we would be looking at cities in at least six of Iraq’s 18 governorates.
Weldon, there are two main reasons I make such a big deal about the number of peacekeepers, the first being that shorting the force would be fatal, the second that raising so many would be extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, which this can’t be construed to be.
I don’t think I’ve questioned your focus on the number of peacekeepers that would be needed. As I mentioned above, I’ve also raised the issue with regard to his plan. When I addressed your point about making a big deal of it, I meant solely with regard to the alternative. That said, I think you are overestimating the amount of troops that would be required under a Biden plan. You are right on mixed cities such as Baghdad, but remember, once the partition that is already happening is guarded by US troops (troops positioned at the division of ethnic/religious regions), that would primarily be in 6 of Iraq’s 18 governorates which have mixed populations, and along the borders dividing the three groups. The internal security of each semi-autonomous region would fall largely to local elements not US or international forces.
200,000 peacekeeepers would be grossly inadequate by historical peacekeeping guidelines, but it would also be double the total number of UN peacekeepers now deployed throughout the world and nearly ten times the size of the largest UN peacekeeping force in history (the post-Dayton Bosnian peacekeeping force, less than a third as large, was primarily NATO, not UN).
I agree. However, I would note, that Turkey has traditionally made the bulk of NATO’s troops. Imagine what China’s million man army, and India’s army could contribute. We don’t need them to fight as much as be seen, (i.e. boots on the ground). How do we legitimize it, give China something for it. The US opens the way for Chinese investment in Iraq, while also moving to negotiate with Iran; thereby addressing another Chinese and Indian concerns. Yes, this isn’t happening under this administration, but here we are assuming that either Biden’s plan gets enough support, or a new president has come into office.
Does anyone really want 50,000 Chinese troops there even if it could be arranged?
Yes, because a lot of it, is their oil (or will be). It’s time we engage China as part of the security mechanism of the global order and not as an opponent (otherwise it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, something this administration has come close to doing). China usually uses its peacekeeping missions as a means to open markets for its products, and to acquire access to resources. As part of the deal, they usually throw in infrastructure aid, construction or FDI; exactly what we need in Iraq.
My objection to the plan is that it is fantasy. It’s a more rational fantasy than The Surge, but it’s still fantasy, and it’s getting in the way of facing up to the horrors of reality.
If a fantasy, perhaps more realistic that pushing for withdrawal hoping such a move will address all the problems we face and which threaten to engulf the whole region. This is not really an argument on your part, just your personal point of view. An assertion, as defined by others above.
That said, I do agree we have to face the horrors of all that has gone wrong. That, however, does not mean that ignoring any potential dangers that lurk behind the mirage of a “withdrawal fixes everything” view.
Will terrible things happen if we withdraw? More than likely, but we are ultimately going to withdraw and there will not be a magical UN force coming in behind us, so we really, really need to focus on mitigating the disaster to whatever extent possible, which ultimately may not be much.
Agreed, but that does not mean that we just allow them to happen. We try to find ways to not only contain the violence, but also of preventing the worst possible outcomes of a withdrawal.
If the international community is to act as the coercive mediator who locks all the factions in a room, one has to wonder when that community will be created. We have the UN but the prospects of it acting effectively seem slim.
JackD, Please refer to Biden’s description of the Contact Group, I was using international community as short-hand for what I described in a previous comment.
I don’t see this administration being proactive on it.
Agreed. However, one of the problems in addressing a plan that is not being implemented is that it is easy to fall into two types of argument. The first says it can never work because such and such…(more valid), the second falls under “it cannot happen because the administration is not implementing it, hence it won’t happen.” (which is less of a valid argument because to an extent allowance must be given to the “if it could be implemented” side.) The main criticism in that instance, which would be valid, and which Weldon raised above is “how do we implement it, impose it on the administration?”
As to Maliki’s friends, he is talking about Iran I am sure. If the point of the “Biden plan” is to avoid a shia dominated and Iranian influenced Iraq, I think that, like the English king who demanded the tide stop, the plan seeks to overcome the inevitable.
It is not that. Iran’s influence will be very strong in the Shiite south in Iraq, that’s inevitable. Here I also point to Biden’s argument that the internal security of homogenous regions falls on the local (native) security forces. This means, he accepts that Iran will have a role to play, but through negotiations with Iran hopes it will be more productive than it currently is.
Okay guys, I’m leaving town in about 3 hrs. so I will not be able to respond to comments until at least Tuesday afternoon. Hence, if you post, please forgive me if I take a while to reply back. Also, thanks for the discussion. It is something that all Americans should be looking at. There are various plans out there, some more feasible, some less so, only by looking at each, their strengths and weaknesses will we be able to arrive at a consensus on how to proceed going forward.
[comment edited by WB for formatting ...]
Sorry, line brakes seem not to have gone through.
nykr – if you resubmit your comment, Weldon can remove the huge one-graph one…it is hard to follow
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